New Digital Activism Data!

Version 1.0 of the Global Digital Activism Set is now available.

Last month my other initiative, the Digital Activism Research Project, released version 1.0 of the Global Digital Activism Data Set (GDADS), a collection of digital activism cases from around the world, created as an open resource to scholars.  I am finally getting around to posting the announcement here, which seems only fair as GDADS began at the Meta-Activism Project.

The release includes the following resources.  Some are available via email so we can track distribution. All requests will be answered promptly and all materials have a Creative Commons license.

1) Documentation: User’s Manual and Codebook 
Description: Contains project history, data description, methodology notes, variable definitions.
Format: Personal Document File (.pdf)
Access: Download Link

2) Coded Case Studies Spreadsheet
Description: Contains 1,180 cases of digital activism from 151 countries and dependent territories, rangine from 1982 through 2012, coded according to 57 variables.
Format: Excel (.xlsx)
Access: email request to Mary at mjoyce AT uw DOT edu

3) Case Study Sources Spreadsheet
Description: Contains links and citations to the source materials for 1,346 cases of digital activism initially collected for the GDADS project.
Format: Excel (.xlsx)
Access: email request to Mary at mjoyce AT uw DOT edu

If you have any additional questions about the project, please contact Mary Joyce at mjoyce AT uw DOT edu.

Global Digital Activism Data Set: 1st Coded Cases Now Public

Until today the project description at meta-activism.org/data-set- “TheGlobal Digital Activism Data Set(GDADS) will be a coded listof digital activism cases from around the world, created as an open resource to scholars” – was accurate. It would be an open coded case list, but until today all that was public was a list of case study titles.

tag cloud of primary targeted countries (CNTRY1)

Today the promise of a public coded list is becoming a reality. In fulfillment of our open research commitment, the first tranche of coded cases – 446 out of the current list of 1,255 – are now available to anyone who wants them. You can view a few variables on this Google Doc (link) to get a sense of what’s been coded thus far. If you want the full coded case list email me at Mary AT meta-activism DOT org. (The reason I am not posting it for download is that I want to track use).

time distribution of cases (BYEAR)

Above and to the left are some basic infographics and I’ll be blogging about my own findings from this initial group of cases. I’m looking forward to seeing what others find.

What it Means to Be a 21st-Century Think Tank

Yesterday the Meta-Activism Project launched its most recent product, Civil Resistance 2.0, which is not really “ours” and not really a “product.” It’s a crowdsourced initiative that will eventually be authored by people both inside and outside our organizations and it does not exist in physical space, just in the cloud. This got me thinking about our values here at MAP, and what it means to be a 21st century think tank.

Along with The Global Digital Activism Data Set, Essential Readings in Digital Activism, and Digital Activism Decoded, MAP is coming to define itself by digital production, flexible human resources through porous collaboration, embracing the economics of abundance, and producing information that is free (in more ways than one).

Digital Production: Our products don’t exist in the world of atoms, they exist in the world of bits. Everything we have created – Civil Resistance 2.0, the Global Digital Activism Data Set, the Essential Readings in Digital Activism resources list, and the book Digital Activism Decoded – exist in digital form. In fact, only the last product exists in physical form. We’re creating products, but we create them only in cyberspace. This saves money and allows for a wide audience.

Flexible Human Resources through Porous Collaboration: Civil Resistance 2.0 is crowdsourced. Anyone can edit the list of methods, which exists as a Google Spreadsheet with no editing or privacy restrictions. For the Global Digital Activism Data Set, we collaborated with Christopher Bail of UNC Chapel Hill, who donated his research assistants’ time to help us code a large tranche of our digital activism case studies. In this way we shared the cost of coding without creating any bureaucratic overhead.

This is the kind of easy and porous collaboration championed by Beth Kanter and Allison Fine in their book The Networked Nonprofit. It also relies on the talent of brilliant volunteers through mechanisms described by Clay Shirky in Cognitive Surplus. The motivation is to leverage passion, talent, and financial resources across a range of institutions and individuals to create the best products at the lowest cost. If we had to pay all the experts and PhD’s that contribute to creating our products, our budget would be at least a few hundred thousand dollars. As it is we pay a small fraction of that, mostly for student labor to code data.

Embracing the Economics of Abundance: As our openness statement declares, we are committed to making our research processes and research products open to the public. But it goes beyond openness. We embrace the economics of abundance on the production side by leveraging the spare time of passionate and brilliant people. We embrace the economics of abundance on the distribution side by creating digital products, of which infinite copies can be made for free. These are the kinds of non-market economics principles discussed in Yochai Benkler’s The Wealth of Networks.

Information Should be Free… and Free: Open source evangelist Richard Stallman made the distinction that his software was free as in freedom, not as in free beer. We believe that information should be free in both ways: it should be legally unrestricted (everything we produce is under a Creative Commons license) but should also be cost-free to the user. Be believe that the information we are distributing about digital activism is important and as such we want it to be accessible to as many people as possible. (I’d imagine most people in intellectual endeavors are of this opinion.) Free digital products help us achieve these goals.

Our goal at the Meta-Activism Project is to innovate on three levels: as an organization, in our research methods, and in the results of that research. We want to study the new phenomenon of digital activism in a new way, and be a new type of organization while doing it.

Digital Activism Research: Learning a Lot About a Little

Kony tweets: a gorgeous N of 1 (source: Gilad Lotan)

We now know a tremendous amount about the Kony 2012 campaign and excellent analysis keeps rolling in: on the Ushahidi blog, Patrick Meier has posted a variety of responses from Ugandans and Ethan Zuckerman has posted a gorgeous visualization fromGilad Lotan of the first 5000 Kony tweets (see left). At a panel at SXSW yesterday, I learned that Invisible Children plans to release their own data on the campaign.

As a digital activism researcher this makes me happy, because we need more empirical qualitative and quantitative analysis of digital activism, and most of the analysis I have read is of this type: nuanced, data-driven, analytically sophisticated. At the same time, it is just one case. We are learning a lot about a little.

This reminds me of 2009, when there was so much attention paid to the use of digital technology in the Iranian post-election protests. Excellent research was conducted by the Web Ecology Project, The Center for International Media Assistance, and The United States Institute of Peace. This happened again in 2011 when in-depth survey data on citizen media use during the Egyptian Revolution was collected by The Engine Room and analyzed by Zeynep Tufekci. The problem with intense but uneven data collection is that there is little basis for comparison. In academic terms, we are left with an N of 1.

I am not criticizing the intense analysis of the Kony case, or any of the other cases. I am pushing for an awareness that knowing a lot about a few cases has limited value because there is a great danger of making baseless extrapolations about how the lessons learned in Iran, Egypt, or the Kony case apply to other digital activism cases. What does our knowledge about media choices in Egypt tell us about media choices in Syria? What will Kony tell use about the next viral video? We don’t know.

The Global Digital Activism Data Set is collecting and comparatively analyzing digital activism cases, but our data is mostly qualitative and narrative. We don’t have network analyses like Gilad’s. For every digital activism case for which we have detailed information, there are thousands for which we know little or nothing. Even as we laud the empirical analysis of individual digital activism cases, we must work for the funding, tools, and academic interest that will allow the Gilad Lotans of the world to conduct their analyses not only on single digital activism cases, but on hundreds.

GDADS Codebook Now Available

Reading Ethan Zuckerman’s posts about openness at yesterday’s Media Lab members’ meeting inspired me to finally publish the Global Digital Activism Data Set codebook (PDF). We’ve been putting off posting it for a while, as it seemed never to be quite ready, but then, remembering the wise words of Clay Shirky (“publish then filter”) Research Coordinator António Rosas and I decided to make it public. (Openness is a core value of the Meta-Activism Project as well.)

The codebook, which lists the variables we will use to interrogate the 1,255 digital activism case studies we have collected, comprises two sections, six sub-sections, and 101 variables. The first section is dedicated to descriptive variables and includes information on sources, timeframe, actors, geography, tools used, framing, and strategy. The second smaller section includes country-level annual indicators of the technological, social, political, and economic context in which the case occurred (table of contents below).

Although we are still in the process of coding the cases (about 250 done so far), we hope that releasing the codebook will give researchers interested in the project a clearer idea of the work we are doing and how it might be useful to their own work.

SUMMARY OF VARIABLES

I. Case Descriptors

Case Meta-Data

  • CASEID – Case ID Number.
  • CODER – Coder´s Name.
  • SECODER – Second Coder´s Name.
  • TITLE – Title of the Case.
  • SOURCELM – Legacy Media Source.
  • SOURCENM – New Media Source.
  • SOURCEJO – Journal Source.
  • SOURCEBK – Book Source.
  • SOURCEOTH – Other Sources.

Time Data

  • BYEAR – Year When Digital Action Began.
  • BMONTH – Month When Digital Action Began.
  • DURATION – Approximate Duration of Digital Action.

Actor Data

  • AGE – Age Estimate of Initiator(s) of Digital Action.
  • INIACT – Initiator(s) of Digital Action.
  • IDENTIACT – Initiator(s) of Digital Action (Textual Description).
  • TARGACT1 – Target of the Digital Action.
  • TARGACT2 – Other Target of Digital Action.
  • TARGAUD1 – Audience Targeted by Digital Action.
  • TARGAUD2 – Other Audience Targeted by Digital Action.
  • ONOFF – Only Online or Online/Offline Action.

Geographic Data

  • SCOPE – Geographic Scope of Digital Action.
  • REGCODE – Geographic Region Code.
  • POLREGCODE – Politically/Economically Defined Region or Institution
  • CNTRY1– Country Targeted by Digital Action.
  • CNTRY2 – Other Country Targeted by Digital Action.
  • CNTRY3 – Other Country Targeted by Digital Action.
  • CNTRY4 – Other Country Targeted by Digital Action.
  • ICNTRY1 – Country of the Initiator(s) of the Digital Action.
  • ICNTRY2 – Country of the Other Initiator(s) of the Digital Action.

Applications Data

  • APP – One or Several Applications Used.
  • SITE – Website Used.
  • BLOG – Blog Used.
  • MSN – Mobile-Based Social Network Used.
  • ISN – Internet-Based Social Network Used.
  • VID– Digital Video Used.
  • FOTO – Digital Photo Used.
  • EMAIL – Email Used.
  • FORUM – Internet Forum Used.
  • EPET – e-Petition Used.
  • CHAT – Chat or Instant Messaging Used.
  • MOBAPP – Mobile Application Used.
  • GAME – Game Used.
  • MAP – Digital Map Used.
  • WIKI – Wiki Used.
  • VOICE – Digital Voice Application Used.
  • ANON – Circumvention Tool Used.
  • OTHAPPID1 – Other Application Used (Textual Description).
  • OTHAPPID2 – Other Application Used (Textual Description).
  • DOCPURP – Document Purpose.
  • BYPURP – Bypass Purpose.
  • SYNTHPURP – Synthesis Purpose.
  • TRANSPURP – Resource Transfer Purposes.
  • COPURP – Co-Creation Purpose.
  • MOBPURP – Mobilization Purpose.
  • BROADPURP – Broadcast Purpose.
  • NETPURP – Network-Building Purpose.
  • VIOLPURP – Technical Violence Purpose.
  • OTHPURP – Other Purpose(s).
  • OTHPURPID1 – Identify Other Purpose(Textual Description).
  • OTHPURPID2 – Identify Other Purpose(Textual Description).

Framing and Strategy Data

  • DIAGPROB – Problem(s) Diagnosis (Textual Description).
  • DIAGCAUS – Cause(s) Diagnosis (Textual Description).
  • DIAGANT – Antagonist(s) Diagnosis (Textual Description).
  • PROALT – Alternative(s) Prognosis (Textual Description).
  • PROPROG – Protagonist(s) Prognosis (Textual Description).
  • MOTFRA – Motivational Frame(s) (Textual Description).
  • CAUSE1 – Cause Advanced or Defended in Digital Action.
  • CAUSE2 – Other Cause Advanced or Defended in Digital Action.
  • CAUSE3 – Other Cause Advanced or Defended in Digital Action.
  • OTHCAUSEID1 – Other Cause (Textual Description).
  • OTHCAUSEID2 – Other Cause (Textual Description).
  • OUTCOME – Outcome of Digital Action.
  • OUTCOMEID – Identify Outcome (Textual Description).
  • OUTDEM – Democratic Outcome(s).
  • OUTDEMID1 – Identify Democratic Outcome (Textual Description).
  • OUTDEMID2 – Identify Democratic Outcome (Textual Description).

II. Country-Level Indicators

  • GDPPC – GDP per Capita.
  • GDPPCY – Data Year for GDP per Capita.
  • GINI – Gini Coefficient of Wealth Distribution.
  • GINIY – Data Year for Gini Coefficient of Wealth Distribution.
  • POP – Total Population.
  • POPY – Data Year for Total Population.
  • YPOP – Youth Population Percentage.
  • YPOPY – Data Year for Youth Population Percentage.
  • POLPOL4 – Polity 4 Score for Political Regime Type.
  • POLPOL4Y – Data Year for Polity 4 Score for Political Regime Type.
  • POLDUR4 – Polity 4 Score for Regime Durability.
  • POLDUR4Y – Data Year for Polity 4 Score for Regime Durability.
  • WVSTS – World Values Survey “Traditional/Secular” Score.
  • WVSTSY – Data Year for World Values Survey “Traditional/Secular” Score.
  • WVSSSEV – World Values Survey “Survival/Self-Expression Values” Score.
  • WVSSSEVY – Data Year for World Values Survey “Survival/Self-Expression Values” Score.
  • FHFR – Freedom House Combined Freedom Score.
  • FHFRY – Data Year for Freedom House Combined Freedom Score.
  • FHPR – Freedom House Press Rating.
  • FHPRY – Data Year for Freedom House Press Rating.
  • TOOLFILT – Tool Filtering.
  • TOOLFILTY – Data Year for Tool Filtering.
  • POLFILT – Political Filtering.
  • POLFILTY – Data Year for Political Filtering.
  • MOB – Mobile Penetration Rate.
  • MOBY – Data Year for Mobile Penetration Rate.
  • NET – Internet Subscriber Penetration Rate.
  • NETY – Data Year for Internet Subscriber Penetration Rate.
  • UDS – Unified Democracy Scores (Means of Means per Country)
  • UDSY – Data Year for Unified Democracy Scores (Means of Means per Country)
  • HDI – United Nations Human Development Index
  • HDIY – Data Year for United Nations Human Development Index

What Causes Digital Activism… And What Does Digital Activism Cause?

There are two important causal questions for digital activism researchers: what causes digital activism and what does digital activism cause? The former is easier to answer. The latter is more difficult but also more interesting.

These two questions can be visualized in linear time where the causes of digital activism (from macro contextual factors like internet penetration rate to micro factors like activist motivation) result in an instance of digital activism (a Facebook campaign, a Twitter hashtag, an e-petition) which is itself the cause of some political or social result (mobilized supporter, a change in policy, even no effect at all). The image above shows these three events and the two causal relationships that overlay them. The instance of digital activism, in the middle of the causal stream, is both a result of the previous causes and a cause of the subsequent results.

1st Causal Relationship: What Causes Digital Activism?

The first causal relationship, the causes of a digital activism instance, are easier to get at, at least in terms of probability. Though we can never know every factor that caused a digital activism instance to arise (a blogger has a fight with her boyfriend, decides not to give him the camera she bought him, and instead uses it to capture a major instance of police abuse), we can still hope to identify the major contextual elements that correlate to instances of digital activism. The Global Digital Activism Data Set will perform this correlative function since it will be possible to correlate the number of instances (or successful instances) of digital activism in a given country to various social, political, technological, and economic contextual factors. For example, we might learn that the youth population and mobile phone penetration rate are more reliable predictors that an instance of digital activism will occur than political freedom and median income.

Here it is appropriate to acknowledge that causation is easier to pin down at the macro level of the nation-state than the micro level of the individual. We can say with confidence which national indicators correlate with national digital activism rates, but as the work of Cosma Shalizi has shown, it is difficult to tell why an individual joined a Facebook cause or followed a tweeted directive to join a protest. However, while questions of individual motivation are interesting, we can learn a great deal about digital activism even without this knowledge. We do not need to know what they acted, only whether or not they did.

2nd Causal Relationship: What Does Digital Activism Cause?

The second causal question – what does the digital activism instance cause? – is more difficult to ascertain but also more important. If there is a clearly visible change in the phenomenon that the digital activism instance aimed to influence (the end of a regime, passage of a new law), to what extent was digital activism responsible?

This is the domain of the “Facebook Revolution” and “Twitter Revolution,” terms that imply that there was an overriding causal connection between the revolution and digital activism instance. Of course, this would only be true if the other possible causal factors (role of traditional media, international pressure, elite intrigue, credibility of alternative governing parties) combined to play only a minority role, which seems unlikely.

If we wanted to demonstrate this type of causation in terms of probability we would need a data set that accurately recorded the relative strength of the same causal factors (to allow for direct comparison) according to a viable strength metric, a significant challenge in and of itself.

While we can determine causation through a rigorous qualitative process, such as interviews with key activists, review of media reports, and survey data, these conclusions only apply to the specific instance they describe. The conclusions could only be extrapolated to other scenarios if there the same qualitative data was available across a representative array of cases.

To give an example, we can only use the outcomes of digital technology use in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, and Syria to make guesses about the outcomes in Saudi Arabia if we have rigorous data on a range of relevant causal factors for all these countries, such that empirical comparative analysis can be carried out. There has been such an academic feeding frenzy in Egypt that it is reasonable to believe that we will have a reliable account of the role digital technology played in that revolution, but without equivalent analysis for other countries, there is no empirical basis for comparison, only plenty of grist for talking-head to make subjective comparisons to Saudi Arabia or Bahrain and make whatever conclusions they like.

How important is digital activism in shaping outcomes of political contention in which it is involved? What are the mechanisms of this influence? Are they the same across countries? We need better methods for answering the big questions of digital activism research.

Cacophany: Why Digital Activism Isn’t Helping America

In the Middle East, activists have used digital tools to bring about dramatic political change under repressive regimes, so why has digital activism had such a lackluster effect in a democracy like the US? The Global Digital Activism Data Set (below) shows that the US has more instances of digital activism than any other country, yet the US is mired in some of the most toxic and unproductive politics in recent memory. I’d argue that it is precisely America’s democracy and pluralism make digital activism less effective at bringing about dramatic change. In a country where everyone is free to speak and mobilize, many will. Attention is divided and the impact of any one initiative represents only one voice among many clamoring to be heard.

Figure 1: Distribution of GDADS Digital Activism Cases by Country

The US has the largest number of digital activism cases in the world, but with unimpressive results.

The result is a cacophany in which organizations and causes compete with each other for citizen support and for the attention of lawmakers. Such intense competition for attention means that each cause is likely to gain only a small number of supporters and a small fragment of lawmaker attention, resulting in little influence and little change.

Digital technology has allowed a far greater number of non-profits and informal citizens groups to have a public voice. Anyone can start a campaign through a blog, a website, a Facebook group, or a Twitter feed. But this ease of access means that competition for attention is fierce. It is good for every non-profit to have their own Facebook group or Twitter feed because it allows organizations to extend their communicative reach, but every organization waving their own flag also means that non-profits – even in the same cause area – are competing with each other for attention from both citizen supporters and law-makers. If they joined together, they would have a greater voice and more capacity to achieve change, yet most non-profits prefer to go it alone and improve their own standing rather than joining with others and losing some autonomy and control.

Of course, there are two quite different groups in America that are very good at speaking with one voice: corporate lobbying associations and the Tea Party. The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America lobbies the government on behalf of over forty pharmaceutical companies. The American Petroleum Institute does the same on behalf of over four hundred oil and gas firms. Though they have a very different structure, members of various Tea Party associations are very good at speaking and acting with one voice, putting forward clear policy priorities and mobilizing members to vote for candidates that support those priorities. Of course, both of these powerful political forces are on the right, firmly supporting the status quo or even pushing America to be more conservative than it already is, making progressive change less likely.

Why can’t the Left get together again like they did in 2008 around the Obama candidacy? Perhaps it is the Left’s values of pluralism and autonomy that make it difficult to self-mobilize in unison. Liberals and progressives believe that diversity is a strength and that people should make up their own minds, not follow marching orders from some central authority. Yet this preferences for diverse causes and autonomous action also means that the Left is inherently resistance to the unified campaigns, directive mobilizations, and clear talking points that are the currency of influence in Washington.

This is not only a demand-side problem about advocates getting together to promote their causes effectively. It’s also a supply-side attention problem on the part of politicians, who are also suffering from information overload. Politicians and their staffs have a limited amount of time to respond to citizens requests in a meaningful way. One can only assume that the barrage of emails, petitions, and the like have produced a stream that politicians are unable to deal with, and the introduction of an official petitions site from the White House supports the assertion that government is willing to listen, they just need some means of moderating requests. (Of course, these simple measures are easily gamed – the most popular petition is one supporting marijuana legalization). In this context, it is understandable that politicians listen to the loudest voices.

America is a pluralist democracy that feeds on competition, it’s in our DNA. But these qualities also make it less likely that we will come together under one banner. Tunisia and Egypt are diverse societies with complex political interest groups, yet during their revolutions people across the political spectrum came together with one voice to oust their tyrannical leaders. Americans also need to come together if they want to force real change.

Until progressive Americans start to use digital technology to collaborate and form mass movements, power will rest in the hands of conservative forces who are already pooling their resources and speaking with one strong voice. We each have the freedom to speak for ourselves, but we will have more power if we speak together.

 

The Proof is in the Pendulum: a History of Digital Activism and Repression

Purist arguments of cyber-optimism and cyber-pessimism are becoming increasingly irrelevant as evidence of digital technology’s ability to both empower and repress accumulates. However, what is the basis of this argument beyond anecdotalism of a slightly broader scope?

I would argue that in the past five year we have witnessed a pendulum swing from activist advantage to government revanche to dense tactical contention between the two. According to the initial findings of the Global Digital Activism Data Set, digital activism (cases of digital technology use to achieve social or political change) did not really take off until the second half of the first decade of this millennium. Though there were a few politically-themed BBS forums in the 1980′s, the graph below shows that that the first real emergence correlates to the commercialization of the World Wide Web and Internet services in the late 1990′s, while the appearance of exponential growth correlates to the emergence of social media (public Facebook, 2006; YouTube, 2005; Twitter, 2006).

Figure 1: Global Digital Activism Data Set Time Series, 1990-2009

Between initial emergence and exponential growth the pendulum swung back and digital repression began. The most sophisticated and influential censorship system, the Chinese firewall, began development in 1998 and was launched in 2003. As the first wave to social media users, bloggers were also the first to be repressed. That same year, in Iran, Sina Motellabi became the first blogger arrested for political activities. The OpenNet Initiative, a project to “investigate, expose and analyze Internet filtering and surveillance practices” began work in 2004. In 2007 the international blog aggregator Global Voices launched its Advocacy project, “dedicated to protecting freedom of expression and free access to information online.”

From the beginning, we can see this history as a swinging pendulum in which activists tactically innovate and repressive governments respond. It could be argued that the first instance of the effective use of digital tactics in furtherance of an activist campaign (as opposed to as a reporting mechanism) was the use of the web in 1994 by Mexico’s Zapatistas. Though governments began to take action against thrill-seeking hackers as early as 1990′s Operation Sundevil, and China began licensing access and persecuting criminal activities in 1994, I would argue that the first instance of digital repression was the December 1997 issuance of updates to the Security Management Procedures in Internet Accessing, a regulation issued by the Chinese Ministry of Public Security that allowed the government to levy fines for “defaming government agencies,” “splitting the nation,” and leaking “state secrets.” Unlike previous Internet regulation regarding access licensing and cyber-crime and censorship of pornography, this regulation is the first I’ve found to specifically target anti-regime political speech (though a 1996 Singaporean regulation censoring “contents which undermine the public confidence in the administration of justice” brushes very close to that line).

There has even been a pendular motion in the recognition of the effects of digital activism and digital repression on global politics. Clay Shirky’s cyber-optimist tome Here Comes Everybody was published in 2009, while Evgeny Morozov’s cyber-pessimist counter-work The Net Delusion was published in early 2011. Now, thanks to the Arab Spring, we are back to focusing on digital activism.

This pendular motion continues into the present day, with digital tactics and counter-tactics most recently exhibited in Egypt, where activists used the Internet to define the political contest and mobilize supporters and the government responded by shutting the whole system down. Though the activists eventually won in Egypt, it seems that forces of digital repression (both government agents and pro-government citizens) now have the upper hand in Syria.

This pendular motion of tactical innovation and government response was previously referred to as a cat-and-mouse game by Patrick Meier of Ushahidi, who asked in a 2009 blog post:

Is this formidable mix [of a political will to obstruct and a technically competent bureaucracy] enough to smoke out digital activist networks in authoritarian states? “The result,” opines Evgeny [Morozov], “is a cat-and-mouse game in which protestors try to hide from the authorities by caring [sic.] out unconventional niches.” So is Tom-the-cyber-cat going to finally do away with cyber-mouse-Jerry?… I’m not ready to place my bets on either Tom or Jerry. I’d rather be up front and say, I don’t know. It depends.

I’d like to update Patrick’s assertion with a little more certainty: no one will win the cat-and-mouse game. Though there is not yet a Global Digital Repression Data Set, I would bet that it would now also exhibit exponential growth as widely-publicized cases of digital activism in the media (and inter-government cooperation) mean repressive governments are becoming ever more savvy about the political uses of digital technology and are developing their own responses. In fact, as governments put more of their significant resources toward the task, I would not be surprised if in the future we see governments taking the tactical lead and activists taking the reactive position. This is not to imply that governments will win – the Internet still has significant uses for activists – but it is to say that neither side is likely to win soon.

The tactical upper hand is likely to be illusory to both as activists have greater capacity for creative experimentation on their side through their greater numbers and a resilient network infrastructure while governments have greater financial resources and control over that infrastructure within their territories. Decisions on privacy and real name policies will affect the field of play, giving governments an advantage if they are enforced and activists an advantage if they are not. Still, the real tactic battle of digital activist versus repressive government has just begun and the pendulum has just begun to swing.

Induction and Deduction in Digital Activism Research

Today I watched The Name of the Rose, a gloomy film about a medieval Sherlock Holmes named William of Baskerville (just in case the Holmes connection was not otherwise evident). It got me thinking about inductive and deductive reasoning.

In inductive reasoning we move from the aggregation of discrete observations to create a theory that explains them. In deductive reasoning we use a relevant theory to explain a discrete observation. As the diagram above indicates, the two are connected. We only have relevant theories because of previous inductive reasoning which was used to arrive at them.

Deductive methods are not well suited to the study of digital activism.

Baskerville and Holmes are both deductive thinkers. They take their theoretic knowledge of physics and human behavior and apply it to individual observations to elucidate them. For example, Baskerville knows that stones role down hills according the qualities of the ground. So when he finds a body at the bottom of a hill he deduces that it might have rolled from further up, rather than falling direct to the bottom point (there are quite a few dead bodies in the film). Likewise, because he knows that poison can kill when ingested, when monks die with evidence of ink on their tongues, he deduces that the ink is poisoned (oops, hope that wasn’t a spoiler).

How does this connect to digital activism? We are in an interesting point in this field in that we have a wide range of theory from sociology, political science, network science, and applied sub-domains like social movement theory that can be applied to the use of digital technology by activists.

The only problem is that the pre-digital evidence on which these theories are built is different from the digital context to which they are now applied. This is not a problem if the context is fundamentally the same, and digital changes are only cosmetic. However, if the presence of digital technology alters the causal mechanism which gives the theory its explanatory power, then the theory is invalid when applied to the new context.

Whence comes the question: does the presence of digital technology make enough of a difference in the function of activism that old theories don’t apply? If this were true, it would incapacitate deductive reasoning in this field because pre-digital theory could not be applied to digital instances.

Fortunately, it’s not the case that previous theories are completely invalid. Anecdotal evidence shows that pre-digital theories such as information cascades and preferential attachment do have explanatory value when applied to digital phenomena. This is both good in that we have a body of knowledge to help us understand the phenomena of digital activism and bad in that we don’t know which theories apply and which don’t.

In one example of pre-digital theory challenged by observation of digital phenomenon, research by Alix Dunn of The Engine Room has shown that decision-making in social movements is possible without leaders because social media platforms like Facebook allow flat groups to make decisions collectively with the most engaged members playing the role of facilitator and influencer while many members of the group shape decisions collaboratively. This flies in the face of classical theories of political organizing, which require central leadership for strategic success.

This puts us in a dangerous epistemological position because if we apply pre-digital theories to digital contexts in which they are invalid we are left with inaccurate conclusions. We are in a minefield of sorts. We don’t know enough about the field to know where to step, yet we need to step through the field in order to know it.

One path through the minefield is to test pre-digital theories in individual contexts where their explanatory power can be verified. For example, scholar Zeynep Tufekci has shown that preferential attachment models explain the emergence of leader/influencers on Twitter during the Egyptan revolution. This is empirically valid, but it is slow moving. Just because a theory applies to one scenario does not mean it will apply to another which seems similar but which is actually causally different.

It is for this reason that I am a strong proponent of inductive reasoning in the field of digital activism. We need to start by observing a wide array of digital activism instances and analyzing that data empirically with as open a mind as possible. From this analysis we may find that certain pre-digital theories continue to hold explanatory value. We will likely also find that certain pre-digital theories no longer do. Some old theories will be tweaked, some will be discarded, and new theory will be made.

This is the empirical process of knowledge creation and it is the logic behind the Global Digital Activism Data Set, a set of over a thousand cases from over a hundred countries going back thirty years. We are currently in the process of coding these cases and then, by comparison, we hope to isolate causal factors. We are making our data open to anyone who wants to use it in the hopes of encouraging other researchers to analyze large and phenomenologically diverse digital activism data sets. We are also eager to know of others who are undertaking similar projects. If you are, please let us know.

 

 

Find Us Today @ Personal Democracy Forum

I’ll be presenting a break-out session on open digital activism research and the Global Digital Activism Data Set at Personal Democracy Forum today in New York, details below. I’ll also report back on any feedback I get from the session.

    Getting Beyond Anecdata: The Global Digital Activism Data Project
    Mary Joyce (moderator) with Zeynep Tefecki of technosociology and Alix Dunn of Tahrir Data Project @ 3:30 – 4:30pm in Room 803

 

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